We study how firms engaged in both R&D and fixed investment manage liquidity and adjust real investment during the recent financial crisis. Among firms with positive R&D expenditures, cuts to fixed investment in the crisis are typically far more severe than cuts to R&D. These firms allocate cash reserves to buffer R&D but do not use cash to protect fixed investment. Some firms appear to go so far as to allow the stock of fixed assets to fall to stabilize R&D. The use of cash holdings and fixed assets to protect R&D is particularly strong among firms most likely to face financing frictions at the start of the crisis. We only find evidence that firms use cash to buffer fixed investment when we expand the sample to include firms with no R&D spending to compete for funds. Our study provides direct evidence on the real effects of liquidity management, highlights a key benefit of precautionary cash reserves, and illustrates the adjustments firms make to navigate a financial crisis.
Introduction
We explore how firms prioritize across competing real investments when dealing with a severe negative finance shock. Our basic idea is that protecting some investments creates more value for the firm than protecting other investments, in large part because adjustment costs differ substantially across alternative real investments. As a consequence, firms should disproportionately use their cash and liquid assets to stabilize some investments, while permitting potentially sharp reductions in others. We test these ideas by focusing on the differential treatment of R&D and fixed investment during the recent financial crisis. We focus on R&D and fixed investment because they are the primary investments for modern firms and they likely have markedly different adjustment costs. 1 In particular, cutting R&D investment typically entails releasing highly skilled technology workers, and reversing these cuts in the future brings about classic costs of adjustment (e.g., future hiring and training costs). In addition, firing R&D workers exacerbates appropriability problems when fired workers transmit proprietary knowledge to competitors. Since neither of these potential costs has any obvious counterpart when it comes to cuts in the rate of fixed investment, we expect firms facing a sharp decline in access to finance to buffer R&D much more aggressively than fixed investment.
We focus on firms with investment in both fixed capital and R&D in the crisis period. Though our insights extend to any time constrained firms face a firm-specific loss of access to finance, the crisis period is well-suited for testing our ideas because there is arguably a large exogenous negative shock to the availability of all forms of finance (e.g., Bliss et al., 2013; Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010) .
During the crisis, our summary statistics show large declines in the flow of new finance, a very sharp drop in fixed investment and modest declines in R&D. Furthermore, the initial decline in cash stocks is sufficient to offset a substantial portion of the loss of internal and external finance. In addition, simple median-based tests suggest that firms responded to the negative finance shock by protecting R&D much more than fixed investment. For example, at the height of the crisis, the median within-firm annual change in R&D investment is a decline of just 2%, while the corresponding change in fixed investment is -25%. Moreover, among the firms forced to cut both R&D and fixed investment during the crisis, an overwhelming majority (84%) cut fixed investment more than R&D (and typically the reductions in fixed investment are far larger).
To formally explore the differential buffering of R&D and fixed investment, we include changes in cash holdings in standard dynamic investment regressions. We are particularly interested in how firms spent stocks of cash holdings to buffer competing investments during the crisis. 2 We employ a "systems"
GMM estimator which addresses the potential endogeneity of all financial variables in the regression. In the crisis period, changes in cash holdings share a very strong negative relation with R&D, particularly in the peak two years of the crisis. While there is some limited evidence in our main sample that cash holdings are used to protect fixed investment at the start of the crisis, the association between changes in cash holdings and fixed investment is far weaker (and typically insignificant) compared to the point estimates in the R&D regressions. Thus, for firms doing both R&D and fixed investment, our evidence suggests that firms spent much more cash protecting R&D compared to fixed investment. An additional test is motivated by the Campello et al. (2010, p. 471) survey evidence that "the vast majority of financially constrained firms sold assets in order to fund operations in 2008." We find a strong negative relation between changes in the stock of fixed assets and R&D, indicating that some firms so aggressively favored R&D that they allowed the stock of fixed capital to fall to provide additional resources to buffer R&D. Finally, when we expand the sample to include large numbers of firms doing little or no R&D, we then find a substantial negative relation between changes in cash holdings and fixed investment. It appears that firms prioritize during a crisis, and when R&D expenditures are not competing for liquidity, firms do in fact allocate some liquidity to protect fixed investment.
We perform a number of robustness and falsification tests. First, we re-estimate our main regressions with alternative controls for investment demand and find that there are no important quantitative changes in our main findings. Second, the need to prioritize across competing real investments in the face of a severe decline in the availability of finance should be strongest among firms 2 Firms may also use debt capacity, derivatives and credit lines to smooth investment. However, Almeida et al. (2014) note that the literature on liquidity management points to cash holdings as the most important source of liquidity when it comes to downside protection. For example, Acharya et al. (2007) show that financially constrained firms whose financing needs arise mainly in low cash flow periods should build cash holdings as opposed to relying on spare debt capacity. In addition, in a survey of CFOs in 29 countries, Lins et al. (2010) conclude that cash holdings are used to buffer negative cash flow shocks while credit lines are used to undertake new investment opportunities in good times.
most dependent on external finance (e.g., small, young, low-payout, and bank-dependent firms). We in fact find that the firms a priori most likely to be affected by the crisis display the strongest evidence of utilizing stocks of cash holdings and fixed assets to buffer R&D investment. Finally, while most of our study focuses on annual data, we reach similar conclusions using quarterly data. In particular, we use a difference-in-differences approach similar to Duchin et al. (2010) and find a significant increase in the use of cash for R&D buffering during the quarters covering the crisis period, further supporting our main conclusions.
Overall, our findings indicate that firms confronted with a negative finance shock protect R&D to a much greater extent than fixed investment. To our knowledge, the differential buffering of R&D and fixed investment has not been explored in prior studies, perhaps because until very recently the corporate finance literature has focused almost exclusively on fixed capital investment. Since R&D is now as large (or larger) than fixed investment for a substantial fraction of firms, assessing how firms prioritize across alternative investments is important for understanding liquidity management decisions in modern firms and for evaluating the real effects of negative finance shocks. In particular, by focusing on differences across R&D and fixed investment, our study provides novel insights on the way firms use their cash reserves, highlights the conditions under which precautionary cash holdings are especially valuable, and offers the first detailed exploration of the impact of the financial crisis on R&D in the U.S.
Our findings are especially relevant for the rapidly growing literature on cash holdings and corporate flexibility (see Almeida et al., 2014 and Denis, 2011 for reviews of the literature). A number of studies develop theoretical models where cash holdings are used to transfer liquidity over time when firms have valuable future projects that may be lost due to financing constraints. 3 Almeida et al. (2004) show that constrained firms save more of their cash flow as cash than unconstrained firms and several other studies show that firms most likely to face frictions in capital markets accumulate more cash (e.g., Harford, 1999; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999) . Furthermore, there is evidence that cash holdings are more valuable for constrained firms (e.g., Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; . But surprisingly few empirical studies explore how firms actually use their cash holdings to protect real investment opportunities. Two exceptions are Denis and Sibilkov (2010) , who find a strong link between cash holdings and fixed investment for constrained firms, particularly those with high hedging needs, and Brown and Petersen (2011) , who show that constrained firms spend cash holdings to smooth R&D. In addition, Duchin et al. (2010) find that firms with more cash reserves have smaller reductions in fixed investment during the early phase of the recent financial crisis. None of these studies, however, explore how firms prioritize their cash holdings across competing investments when navigating a severe negative finance shock.
The use of cash to buffer R&D that we document is an important illustration of firms transferring liquidity into the future to support investment. Corporate liquidity and financial flexibility can support investment either by allowing firms to readily fund valuable new investment projects or by preventing the slashing of key ongoing projects during a period of financial distress, which is clearly the focus of our study. The favorable treatment of R&D over fixed investment sheds light on the types of firms that are most (and least) likely to gain from financial flexibility. In particular, there is an important literature on the agency costs of cash holdings (see Duchin et al., 2010 for a review) and our findings point to the types of firms where the benefits from precautionary cash holdings likely outweigh agency costs. It is also worth pointing out that our findings suggest that studies exploring the precautionary role of cash and focusing only on fixed investment may reach incorrect conclusions about the importance of stocks of liquidity for supporting investment and preserving firm flexibility. Finally, our results help explain the finding that R&D intensity, but not fixed investment, is strongly positively correlated with the level of cash holdings across firms (Bates et al., 2009 ) and why cash is more valuable in R&D-intensive firms and industries (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; .
Since there has been almost no assessment of the impact of the recent financial crisis on R&D, our study also contributes to the literature on the economic effects of the crisis. During the recent crisis, growth, our findings suggest that liquidity management policies by firms likely kept the long-run costs of the financial crisis from being even more severe. 5 A key implication is that precautionary cash reserves not only have important private benefits for R&D-intensive firms, but also external benefits that accrue to the broad economy.
A number of other studies explore financing and investment decisions during the crisis. (2010) find that fixed investment falls less for firms holding more cash reserves at the start of the crisis.
Our study differs from Duchin et al. (2010) in several ways, most notably our examination of how cash reserves are differentially allocated across competing investments. Kahle and Stulz (2013) argue that their evidence on similarities in investment by bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent firms cast doubts as to whether a credit supply shock played a central role in the recent crisis. We note that for our sample firms, credit finance is unimportant compared to the sharp declines in internal and external equity finance, so credit shocks per se are not the most important finance shock affecting our firms. Furthermore, our findings suggest that firms worked aggressively to protect some types of investment, which they would not do if hit predominantly by a demand shock rather than a finance shock. Finally, Bliss et al. (2013) document substantial cuts in corporate payouts during the crisis, particularly for firms most likely to be susceptible to declines in credit availability, consistent with a negative shock to the availability of finance during the crisis.
Motivation and Empirical Predictions

Adjustment Costs for R&D and Physical Investment
R&D investment consists primarily of wage payments to scientists and engineers and there are multiple types of adjustment costs associated with firing/rehiring these workers. One obvious cost is hiring and training expenses which can be very large for highly skilled workers (see the review in Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996) . Second, as Hall and Lerner (2010) point out, when the "knowledge created by R&D workers is "tacit" rather than codified, it is embedded in the human capital of the firm's employees, and is therefore lost if they leave or are fired." A final type of adjustment cost, broadly defined, is the loss in firm value arising from fired technology workers transmitting critical proprietary information to competitors.
Of key importance to our arguments and predictions, there are several reasons to believe that adjustment costs rise much faster for R&D than for physical investment. First, the few studies that estimate adjustment costs for both R&D and physical investment typically report that R&D adjustment costs are substantially greater (e.g., Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989) . Second, recent studies focusing specifically on physical investment report relatively low adjustment cost estimates (e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) . Finally, most physical investment is spending on new equipment. Intuitively, this type of investment need not create high adjustment costs as sharp reductions in equipment investment likely do not involve firing skilled workers.
Formal Intuition
Standard Euler conditions for investment provide insights for how firms should manage liquidity to buffer competing investments in a financial crisis (see the Appendix for a more detailed discussion).
Denote investment in fixed capital by I, the stock of fixed capital by K, investment in technology by RD, the stock of technology by T and the prices of the two investments by P I and P RD . The Euler conditions for fixed investment and R&D are
Equation (1) is equivalent to the Euler equation for fixed investment in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) and Love (2003) , while Equation (2) is the counterpart equation for R&D and is similar to the first-order condition in Hall (1995) and Hall and Lerner (2010 Suppose the firm is confronted with a one-period financial crisis that hits in period t and is expected to be over by the beginning of t+1. The crisis drives λ t above expected λ t+1 and thus drives down θ t on the right-hand side of the Euler conditions. To rebalance the conditions, firms clearly need to shift some investment (both fixed investment and R&D) from period t to period t+1, as such a shift drives down the marginal cost of adjustment in period t and drives up the marginal cost of adjustment in t+1.
Other things equal, if marginal adjustment costs change much more slowly for fixed investment compared to R&D, firms need to make much larger (proportionate) cuts to fixed investment in order to rebalance the Euler conditions. This implies that optimizing firms will disproportionately allocate scarce stocks of liquidity to buffer R&D.
Estimating Equation
Following Hall and Lerner (2010) , we move from the Euler conditions to an estimating equation by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function and quadratic adjustment costs.
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The baseline empirical Euler specification is:
where INV j,t is investment (either fixed investment or R&D) for firm j at time t. Lagged investment and investment squared appear on the right-hand side of the regression; the quadratic term (INV 2 ) appears because of quadratic adjustment costs and the expected coefficient is negative. The baseline specification also includes lagged firm sales, a firm-specific effect (α j ) and a time-specific effect (d t 
In equation (4) we add contemporaneous and lagged values of cash flow (CashFlow) and funds from stock issues (StkIssues) to measure firm's access to both internal and external finance. We also include changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings), which captures the use of cash holdings as a source of liquidity for buffering investment. Finally, we add current sales as an additional control for investment demand. In Section 4 we consider alternative specifications with different demand controls and other sources of liquidity for buffering investment. All regression variables are scaled by the beginning-ofperiod stock of firm assets.
Empirical Predictions
If firms are effective at smoothing R&D we expect β 1 to be close to one when INV in equation (4) is measured by R&D (which in fact is the case in all of our R&D regressions). In contrast, when INV is measured by fixed investment, if firms make little effort to buffer fixed investment during a crisis, we expect β 1 to be well below one (which is the case for nearly all of our fixed investment regressions). Our main prediction concerns the pattern of coefficients for ΔCashHoldings. If firms in a crisis disproportionately spend cash holdings protecting R&D, we expect negative coefficients for ∆CashHoldings in the R&D regressions that are larger (in absolute value) relative to the estimates in the fixed investment regressions.
7 Furthermore, we expect the largest (absolute value) coefficients for ∆CashHoldings in the R&D regressions for the narrow time period that covers the peak of the financing crisis.
An additional prediction concerns cuts in the stock of fixed capital to buffer R&D. If firms run low on the amount of cash reserves available for investment buffering in any given period, the sale of non-core assets can also provide funds for buffering R&D. Campello et al. (2010) report that among the constrained firms in their survey, 70% of the CFOs indicated that they sold more assets in the crisis than before. 8 We also note that firms do not have to actually sell fixed capital to obtain extra resources for R&D. Rather, as we discuss later in the paper, resources can be diverted to R&D by cutting fixed investment so aggressively that it does not cover depreciation of fixed capital. In either case, if firms allowed the stock of fixed capital to fall in order to protect R&D in the crisis, changes in the stock of fixed capital (which we add to equation (4) in some regressions) will have a negative association with R&D.
Our final prediction is that firms a priori most likely to face binding constraints at the start of the crisis should display stronger evidence of managing their liquidity and other assets to protect R&D.
Consider, at the start of the crisis, a firm with investment well in excess of cash flows (e.g., a young firm).
For such a firm, loss of access to finance will surely necessitate the use of stocks of liquidity if any buffering of investment levels is to occur. This need not be the case, however, for a firm whose investment levels are initially well below the flow of internal finance (e.g., mature firm) since a negative finance shock can be absorbed without drawing down stocks of liquidity to buffer investment.
Data, Summary Statistics, and Median-Based Tests
Data and Industry Breakdown
We construct the sample from publicly traded U.S. firms with coverage in the Compustat database. We exclude firms with a primary SIC code from a regulated (SIC 4900-4999) or financial (SIC 6000-6999) industry. We then drop any firm-year observation if capital expenditures or sales is negative, total assets are less than $5 million in 2005 dollars, or sales growth is greater than 100%. We also require of the five high-tech industries. Thus, while the requirement that firms report R&D naturally leads to a sample concentrated in the high-tech sector, any broad sample of publicly traded firms will be heavily weighted towards high-tech. At the end of the paper, we discuss some findings for firms in the high-tech sector compared to firms outside of the high-tech sector.
We focus on annual data for three reasons. First, unlike fixed investment, a very large fraction of
Compustat firms report R&D only at the annual frequency (and these firms tend to be younger and smaller firms). Second, there are a number of problems (e.g., seasonality) encountered in using quarterly data, some of which are discussed in Kahle and Stulz (2013) . Third, the literature on investment and financing constraints, particularly studies estimating structural models, rarely employ quarterly data. A likely reason is that there is a non-trivial "time to build" (e.g., Zhou, 2000) , which potentially requires a large number of lags of financial variables when quarterly data is employed. In particular, firms hit with a finance shock, even if they respond instantly, cannot immediately cut investment (e.g., within a quarter)
because it takes time to receive and install equipment ordered in previous quarters.
Using the rules stated above, our main sample (Full) has 1009 firms. As will be apparent in the summary statistics, firms that do both R&D and fixed investment have a tendency to do less fixed investment than R&D. We therefore report some results for a sub-set of the Full sample comprised of only firms with average fixed investment-to-assets ratios over 2004 to 2006 (years just prior to the crisis) of at least 0.03. There are 566 firms in this "HighCap" sample. We use the 0.03 cutoff for capital spending because it yields a sample of firms having, on average, fairly similar levels of R&D and fixed investment prior to the start of the financial crisis. Our results are completely unaffected for a wide range of alternative minimum cutoff values for fixed investment (e.g., 0.02 to 0.04).
The Crisis Period and Descriptive Statistics
In our discussion of the summary statistics, we focus on 2008 and 2009, given that it is well known that the severity of the crisis increased dramatically starting in September of 2008. 10 Table 2 reports mean values of the key financing and investment ratios over the 2004-2010 period for both the Full and HighCap samples. All variables are scaled by beginning of period total assets and we remove the 1% tail of the distribution in order to reduce the impact of outliers. Cash flow is measured as gross of R&D, since R&D is expensed and we want to measure cash flow before expenditures on both R&D and fixed capital. Net stock issues are computed net of stock buybacks and net debt issues are funds from new long-term debt issues net of long-term debt reductions.
Panel A of Table 2 Table 2 ). 2008, causing some firms to hoard liquidity to protect the firm in the event of being cut off from capital markets for a substantial period of time.
If firms are surprised by the length (or severity) of a crisis and thus seek to rebuild cash holdings before the crisis abates, what does this imply for investment buffering? Suppose a crisis is expected to last one period (period t) but in fact extends into period t+1. Other things equal (e.g., loss of access to finance in t+1 is similar to period t), cuts to total investment should be more severe in period t+1 as the change in cash holdings is now positive. Nevertheless, firms can continue to buffer R&D even when compelled to rebuild cash holdings, and one way to do this is to make very sharp cuts to fixed investment:
if firms cut fixed investment proportionately more than the negative shock to the availability of finance, the firm can cut R&D proportionately less than the shock to finance (and still satisfy the budget constraint). 12 In addition, as noted above, firms can effectively make fixed investment negative by selling off assets, providing additional resources to buffer R&D.
Within-Firm Changes in R&D and Fixed Investment
Given the importance to our study of differences in the relative magnitudes of investment declines, we present more details on the frequency and size of within-firm adjustments to R&D and fixed investment during the crisis. For each firm, we compute the year-to-year percentage changes in R&D and fixed investment. We focus on R&D and CAP ratios (as in Table Figure 2a shows that when firms do cut R&D, the vast majority of cuts are modest (most are less than 20%). In sharp contrast, Figure 2b shows that it is common for firms to make very large cuts in fixed investment, a substantial fraction of which exceed 50%.
Finally, we compare the relative size of the cuts in R&D and fixed investment among the firms cutting both R&D and fixed investment between 2008 and 2009. For each of the 452 firms with cuts to both investments we divide the percent change in fixed investment by the percentage change in R&D, thereby comparing relative changes in fixed investment and R&D for the same firm. The full distribution of this measure is illustrated in Figure 3 . For only around 16% of the firms (74 firms) is the ratio less than one, indicating that, in percentage terms, very few firms cut R&D more than fixed investment.
Furthermore, firms typically cut fixed investment much more than R&D, with 59% of the firms cutting fixed investment more than twice as much as R&D, and 24% cutting fixed investment at least five times as much.
Main Results
GMM Estimation Approach
We estimate equation (4) with the "system" GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel models
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This approach jointly estimates equation (4) in differences and in levels, using lagged levels as instruments for the regression in differences and lagged differences as instruments for the regression in levels. The sys-GMM estimator addresses the potential endogeneity of all financial variables as well as the dynamic panel bias induced from including the lagged dependent variable in a regression with a firm fixed effect and the approach is widely used to estimate dynamic panel regressions (e.g., Bond et al., 2003; Flannery and Hankins, 2013) . We report one-step GMM estimates using lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments for the regression in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 for the regression in levels. To assess instrument validity we report a Hansen J-test of the null that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, a difference-in-Hansen test that evaluates the validity of the instruments used in the levels equation, and an m2 test for secondorder autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. These tests generally indicate no major problems with our primary instrument set, particularly in the most important specifications. In all estimates we compute standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. Table 3 reports estimates of equation (4) cover very brief periods, they provide additional insights into liquidity management as the crisis unfolded.
Estimates for R&D and Fixed Investment
We are able to estimate dynamic regressions for relatively short periods because we use lagged values from the pre-crisis period as instruments. While Table 3 reports coefficient estimates on both current and lagged financial variables, to simplify the discussion we focus on the sum of the coefficients for each financial variable. The chi-squared tests for the statistical significance of these sums are reported at the bottom of the table, together with test statistics evaluating instrument validity. 
Alternative Controls for Demand
The empirical literature on financing constraints uses a variety of different measures to control for investment demand, including both Q and sales growth. In Table 4 , we replace current and lagged sales with Q and sales growth and report the results for the same time periods utilized in Table 3 . For the sake of readability, Table 4 (and subsequent tables) reports the sums of the coefficients (current and lagged), together with p-values from chi-squared tests that the sum is equal to zero. In addition, we do not report coefficients for lagged R&D and fixed investment, which are similar to coefficients in the corresponding regressions in Table 3 Table 4 are very similar to the corresponding sums in Table 3 . Once again, for R&D, the ΔCashHoldings coefficients are quantitatively large (and significant), particularly in the peak years of the financial crisis. For fixed investment, the ΔCashHoldings coefficients are quantitatively small in all time periods and only statistically significant in the 2004-2010 regression. So, using alternative controls for demand (as reported in Table 4 ) has no impact on the main findings in Table   3 .
Additional R&D Regressions
In Table 5 , we consider modifications to the baseline specification to evaluate a different channel We note that in all regressions, the coefficients on the lagged R&D terms are consistent with the estimates reported in Table 3 . In columns 1 and 2, we add the change in the stock of capital (ΔK) to our baseline specification. If firms reduce the stock of fixed capital to increase available liquidity for buffering R&D, the estimated coefficient on ΔK will be negative. The sum of the coefficients on ΔK is near zero for the 2004-2010 period (column 1). In contrast, the sum of coefficients on ΔK is negative, statistically significant, and large in absolute value (-0.420) during the crisis period (column 2). The lack of a ΔK finding in the broad 2004-2010 period, together with the sizable negative coefficient for ΔK in the narrow crisis period is logical: the use of fixed assets to buffer R&D is surely rather costly and is unlikely to be widely used except in a severe crisis.
In columns 3 and 4, we check the robustness of the specification in columns 1 and 2 to the alternative demand controls used in Table 4 (Q and sales growth in place of levels of sales). There are no quantitative changes in the sum of coefficients for either ΔCashHoldings or ΔK. In columns 5 and 6, we eliminate lags of financial variables from equation (4), but do maintain the lagged R&D variables. So the point estimates reported are not the sums, but rather the coefficients for contemporaneous financial variables. The coefficient estimates in columns 5 and 6 are similar to the sums reported in columns 3 and 4. In particular, for the crisis period (column 6), the point estimate for ΔCashHoldings is -0.151 and the point estimate for ΔK is -0.452 (both are highly statistically significant).
Results for Firms a priori Most Likely to Face Binding Constraints
We next explore splits of the data based on proxies commonly used in the literature to separate firms into groups that are a priori more or less likely to face binding financing constraints. We sort firms based on age, size, payout level and "bank dependence" in the years immediately preceding the start of the crisis. Age is an especially attractive way to sort firms because age is less endogenous than other splitting criteria (Fee et al., 2009; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) . Furthermore, young firms are more likely to have total investment in excess of the flow of internal finance, forcing them to make greater adjustments in the event of a collapse in access to external finance. We compute firm age as the number of years since the firm first appears in Compustat with a non-missing stock price and consider firms young if their average age in the 2004 to 2006 period is 15 or less, and mature otherwise, the same age cutoff used in . To sort firms based on size and payout we first find firm averages of the book value of total assets and the net payout (dividends plus stock buybacks minus stock issues) ratio over the 2004 to 2006 period. We then consider firms small (low payout) if their average assets (net payout ratio) is in the bottom 70 th percentile of sampled firms and large (high payout) otherwise. Finally, our bank dependence measure is motivated by Duchin et al. (2010) . We consider firms "bank dependent"
if they have no bond rating reported in Compustat and an average debt-to-assets ratio of at least 1% during the pre-crisis period (2004) (2005) (2006) . All other firms are put in the "not bank dependent" group, which includes firms with a bond rating or with trivial levels of debt going into the crisis. Table 6 reports regression results using the four alternative ways to sort constrained and unconstrained firms. We focus on the 2007-2009 time period and we report sums of the financial coefficients as we did in Tables 4 and 5 Overall, the findings in Table 6 show that the firms a priori most likely to face binding constraints during the crisis period display the strongest evidence of utilizing stocks of cash holdings and fixed assets to buffer R&D investment. Moreover, these results provide additional evidence against a demand-side interpretation of our findings in Tables 3-5. The logic is that demand shocks should impact all firms, while our findings for R&D buffering with cash holdings and stocks of fixed capital are concentrated among firms a priori more likely to be impacted by loss of access to finance during the crisis.
Quarterly Data and Difference-in-Differences Estimates
We discussed earlier why we focus on annual data and not quarterly data. However, one particular advantage of quarterly data is that we can zero in on narrow episodes of the recent financial crisis. In particular, Duchin et al. (2010) our sample that report quarterly R&D data. The estimates of our main specification using quarterly data (available on request) are qualitatively similar to the results reported above. For example, when the regression contains current and three lags of quarterly financial variables, the sum of ΔCashHoldings coefficients in the R&D regression is approximately -0.100, statistically significant, and much larger than the corresponding sum of ΔCashHoldings coefficients in the fixed investment regression.
15
Second, quarterly data also allows us to estimate a difference-in-differences regression motivated by the approach in Duchin et al. (2010) . They estimate a standard Q-model of investment and include an interaction between firm cash holdings prior to the start of the crisis and a dummy variable equal to one for all crisis quarters. Their interest is identifying whether fixed investment during the crisis is higher for firms with larger cash reserves at the start of the crisis. We can build on this approach to explore whether firm use of cash reserves for R&D buffering is higher during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period, as our arguments would suggest. We construct an indicator variable (EarlyCrisis) that is equal to one for the four quarters 2007Q3-2008Q2 and zero otherwise. We then interact the EarlyCrisis dummy variable with firm ΔCashHoldings, and it is this interaction which captures whether there is a difference in firm use of cash holdings for investment between the 2007Q3-2008Q2 and the pre-crisis period. We also explore the use of cash for investment buffering deeper into the crisis (following Table 10 In Table 7 , we report the difference-in-differences estimates for R&D in the first three columns, and fixed investment in the last three columns. We start with a specification that includes only Q, Cash flow, ΔCashHoldings, and the interaction between ΔCashHoldings and EarlyCrisis. The EarlyCrisis indicator variable does not enter separately because we include dummy variables for each quarter. Other than our focus on quarterly changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings) rather than the pre-crisis level of cash, this specification follows the main difference-in-differences regression in Duchin et al. (2010) .
While they use a standard within-firm estimator, we continue our approach of instrumenting all financial variables with lagged values, an issue that is more important in our setting given our focus on changes in cash during the crisis period and our inclusion of firm stock issues in some specifications.
The estimates for R&D in column (1) (4) show a negative and significant coefficient on both of these interaction terms. In fact, the coefficient estimate is larger (in absolute value) for the ΔCashHoldings*LateCrisis interaction, which is consistent with the very large ΔCashHoldings estimates we find using annual data for the [2008] [2009] period in Table 3 .
In the final three columns we report a similar set of regressions for fixed investment. In sharp contrast to the results for R&D, the difference-in-differences results suggest that firms do not allocate more cash to fixed investment during the crisis, consistent with earlier evidence (in particular Table 3 ).
Overall, the findings in Table 7 , which are based on a very different empirical approach than used earlier in the paper, support our conclusions that firms doing both R&D and fixed investment allocated cash to protect the later and not the former during the recent crisis. 16 We have estimated similar regressions using the annual data and draw identical conclusions about the increasing allocation of cash reserves to R&D during the crisis. 
Additional Tests
In this section we provide some tests of robustness by exploring different instrument sets as well as splits of the main sample into high-tech and low-tech firms. We also provide some additional findings for fixed investment using alternative samples, including a broad sample that is made up primarily of firms not reporting R&D. All results not reported in a table are available on request.
Different Instrument Sets
The GMM estimator we use relies on lagged values of the regression variables for instruments.
We use lags t-3 to t-4 in our main results for two reasons: i) overall, the specification tests indicate no major problems with this instrument set, and ii) using all available lags as instruments results in a proliferation of instruments that potentially weakens the specification tests and overfits the endogenous variables (e.g., Roodman, 2009 at the 1% level, whereas the corresponding estimate in the CAP regression is essentially zero. We also get similar results if we start the instruments one period sooner (t-2), though in this case the specification tests weaken considerably in some regressions. Table 1 shows that the majority of our sample falls within five broad two-digit high-tech industries. A logical question is whether our findings on the use of cash during the crisis are driven only by high-tech companies protecting R&D, or if they extend to R&D activities in other sectors as well.
High-Tech vs. Low-Tech Splits of Data
When we re-estimate our main regressions for the "high-tech" portion of the sample only, the sum of coefficients on ΔCashHoldings is -0.157 (p-value=0.026). In the "low-tech" firms, the corresponding estimate is -0.121 (p-value=0.121). Moreover, among the low-tech firms with substantial R&D expenditures (R&D ratio of at least 0.05 during the pre-crisis interval), the estimate on ΔCashHoldings is very similar in magnitude to the estimate for the high-tech sample (-0.159). Thus, though our estimates for the low-tech sample are not as precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size, our results suggest that both high-tech and non-high-tech companies were interested in protecting R&D during the crisis period, particularly those non-high-tech companies with substantial R&D activities to protect.
Additional Fixed Investment Regressions: Alternative Samples
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that firms doing both R&D and fixed investment allocated little or no cash holdings to protect fixed investment during the financial crisis. It is possible that we find relatively little evidence of firms using ΔCashHoldings for fixed investment in these regressions because the level of fixed investment is smaller than the level of R&D in the Full sample (see Panel A of Table 2 ).
We explore this possibility by estimating regressions for the HighCap sample, where fixed investment and R&D levels are similar (see the discussion of Panel B, Table 2 ). The first two columns of Table 8 report fixed investment results using equation (4) Table 3 .
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 In the second half of Table 8 we consider an entirely new sample (BroadCap) that includes firms we initially excluded from the sample due to lack of information on R&D. Many firms report information on fixed investment but no information on R&D. Absence of R&D information likely means that R&D is zero or trivial, since firms that fail to report R&D are typically in industries that traditionally do little R&D. To construct the BroadCap sample we simply drop the requirement that firms report R&D. The idea is that when R&D is not competing for scarce stocks of liquidity, firms may be more willing to allocate cash holdings to protect fixed investment. As Table 8 shows, including firms doing little or no R&D increases the sample size a great deal, and thus the BroadCap sample is heavily weighted towards firms doing little or no R&D.
Columns 5 and 6 report estimates of our baseline regression for the 2004-2010 and 2007-2009 periods. Of particular interest, the coefficient estimates on ΔCashHoldings are statistically significant and fairly substantial (-0.132 and -0.149 ). In column 7 we continue to focus on the 2007-2009 period and report estimates of the specification that includes debt issues but drops lags of the financial variables. The coefficient estimates on cash flow, stock issues and debt issues are positive and statistically significant.
More importantly, the coefficient on ΔCashHoldings (-0.104) remains sizeable and statistically significant. However, as with the regressions in columns 5 and 6, the test statistics evaluating instrument validity are poor for the BroadCap results reported in column 7. We therefore estimate the regression using difference GMM instead of system GMM and report the results in column 8. The results using this alternative estimator also show a substantial negative (-0.171) and significant relation between
ΔCashHoldings and fixed investment. Furthermore, the Hansen J-test indicates no problems with instrument validity. Thus, the BroadCap results in Table 8 suggest that during the recent crisis some firms -namely firms where R&D is not a competing use of funds -did protect fixed investment with cash reserves.
17
We note that these findings for the BroadCap sample provide additional evidence against a demand-side interpretation of our overall findings. Suppose the only reason we find evidence that firms protect R&D far more than fixed investment during the crisis is because: i) demand fell more for fixed investment than for R&D, and ii) our demand-side controls are inadequate. If this demand-side story is the principal explanation, we should not find evidence of cash holdings being used to protect fixed investment in any samples of firms. Instead, once the sample consists primarily of firms where R&D is not competing for scarce stocks of liquidity, we find that firms do in fact use cash reserves to buffer fixed investment.
17 If we divide the BroadCap sample into those firms doing R&D (our main sample) and those firms not in our main sample (low or no R&D), we find evidence of fixed investment smoothing only in the low/no R&D firms. Specifically, the coefficient estimate (p-value) on ΔCashHoldings is -0.237 (0.065) in the low/no R&D subsample and -0.045 (0.074) for R&D firms. This is precisely what we expect, given the fact that in our main sample, we found no evidence of fixed investment smoothing for firms reporting R&D information.
Conclusion
We study how firms prioritize across competing real investments when they encounter a severe negative finance shock. Since adjustment costs for R&D likely increase much faster than those for fixed investment, we expect firms to allocate a disproportionate amount of available liquidity to R&D during periods when access to finance declines sharply. We study the recent financial crisis and find strong support for this idea. First, we find that the large majority of firms engaged in both fixed investment and R&D cut the former far more than the latter. Second, we estimate dynamic investment regressions that include the changes in cash holdings, allowing us to directly explore how firms spend liquidity to support investment. These regressions show that firms allocate a disproportionate share of cash holdings to buffer R&D and even take the extreme step of allowing their stock of fixed capital to fall in order to support R&D. This favorable treatment of R&D compared to fixed investment is particularly pronounced in the firms who a priori were likely to face the most severe financing constraints during the crisis. We also find that firms engaged in no (or very little) R&D -and thus where R&D is not a competing use of funds -do allocate cash holdings to buffer fixed investment. Overall, our findings demonstrate that when firms must prioritize among competing real investments during a crisis, they allocate liquidity primarily to protect R&D. Based on these findings, we conclude with some final thoughts on the private and public benefits of cash holdings.
In the recent crisis, aggregate industrial R&D did not fall in 2008 and declined by 2.9% in 2009 (in nominal terms), far less than aggregate fixed investment. Given how dramatically internal finance and stock issues fell, it is hard not to conclude that collectively firms were rather successful at protecting R&D. Since our sample contains a large fraction of total corporate R&D, our findings suggest that cash holdings played an important role in protecting aggregate R&D, which arguably mitigated some of the long-run costs of the crisis. The rationale is that unlike fixed investment, there are large "spillovers" from new knowledge creation, suggesting that the social returns to R&D can be very large (see the reviews in Griliches, 1992, and , making R&D a critical driver of economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) . Bates et al. (2009) report that cash holdings (per dollars of assets) was at an all-time high just before the recent crisis, which to many observers in the financial press seemed like an excessive level of liquidity.
18 Duchin et al. (2010) explore the connection between cash holdings and investment during the recent crisis and conclude (p. 423) that "seemingly excess cash may in fact benefit firms in times of dislocation in markets for external finance." Our results support this view, but with the important qualification that cash holdings in times of dislocation appear to be most beneficial to R&D-intensive firms compared to more traditional companies. Moreover, to the extent that R&D buffering has the economy-wide benefits discussed above, cash holdings can produce substantial benefits that are external to the firm. This implies that for many R&D-intensive firms, "seemingly excess cash" from a private point of view may in fact be closer to what is socially optimal.
Appendix
We modify the standard dynamic optimization model used in Love (2003) and a number of other studies (e.g., Whited, 1992; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998) . Similar to Hall (1995) , one modification is that output is a function of both fixed capital (K) and technology (T), rather than just fixed capital and we follow the literature in assuming a one-period time to build lag for both investments. Quantity of investment in fixed capital is denoted by I and investment in technology is denoted by RD and prices of these two investments are P I and P RD . A second modification is that we allow the firm to have positive cash holdings, which can be used (drawn down) to partially relax financing constraints during a crisis. To simplify, we ignore debt finance (as does Love (2003)), which has no impact on the first-order conditions considered below.
Managers are assumed to maximize the expected present value of dividends subject to the capital accumulation and financing constraints. Equations (A1)-(A6) characterize the problem:
{It+s, RDt+s}s=0 s=1 subject to
T t+1 = T t + RD t (A4)
In equation (A1), ξ t is a productivity shock, D t is the dividend paid to shareholders, β t+s-1 is a discount factor from period t+s to period t and E t is the expectation conditional on information known at time t. Equation (A2) is the "sources and uses" condition and determines the size of dividends. As is standard in the literature, adjustment costs for fixed investment (( I t , K t-1 )) are assumed to be convex and depend on the level of both I and K (e.g., typical to assume  depends on I/K). Symmetrically, we assume the adjustment costs for R&D ( (RD t , T t-1 )) are convex and depend on the level of both R&D and T (e.g., Hall, 1995; Hall and Lerner, 2010) . In equation (A2), ∆ CH t is the change in the level of cash holdings (CH), which can be either positive (use of funds) or negative (source of funds). Equations (A3), (A4) and (A5) describe the path of accumulating fixed capital, technology and cash holdings, ignoring depreciation (which adds no additional insights to the analysis). Equation (A6) introduces financing constraints in the manner commonly done in the literature (e.g., Love, 2003) : there is a non-negativity constraint on dividends (i.e., no new share issues). The multiplier on this constraint, λ t , is the shadow value to the firm of being able to obtain equity finance by paying negative dividends (or generating additional internal equity finance). Within this framework, one way to think of a financing crisis is as a sharp decline in the availability of internally generated finance (i.e., sharp fall in П(K t , T t )), which was a major feature of the 2007-2009 crisis. Alternatively, one could assume that firms face perfect capital markets and can issue new external equity during normal times (λ = 0) and Equation (A6) is only present during a financing crisis (λ > 0). The Euler conditions for the constrained maximization problem are given in equations (1) and (2) in Section II of the paper.
It is important to point out the key role of cash holdings in equation (A2) Table 1 . (1)-(4) the regression sample is the HighCap sample described in Table 1 . In columns (5)-(8) the regression sample includes all firms in the Full sample plus the firms that were excluded due to lack of R&D information. In columns (1)- (7) estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation in levels. In column (8) estimation is by difference GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the differenced regression equation. Fixed firm and time effects are included in all regressions. Columns (1)- (2) and (5)- (6) report the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged financial variables. The models in columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8) 
